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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most intractable legal conundrums of our modern
era concerns whether and when individuals earn the right to
compensation as a result of governmental intrusions upon their
property rights. Resolving this query is no simple task for our
courts and legislatures because every individual’s political, financial
and ideological interests are necessarily impacted by any proposed
or actual solution. A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision,
1
Dale Properties, LLC v. State, exemplifies how these broader issues
can arise from an ordinary, everyday occurrence.
† J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Political
Science & English, Saint John’s University, 2001.
1. 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002).
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Dale Properties, LLC (“Dale”) owns an undeveloped tract of
2
land in Oakdale, Minnesota. In 1997, a median crossover was
3
closed opposite the property’s only point of access. As a result,
access to and from the westbound lane of Highway 5 was severely
4
restricted. After Dale found difficulty in the development or sale
5
6
of the property, it sought compensation from the state. The issue
presented in Dale Properties, LLC v. State was narrow: can a
compensable taking occur when the closure of a median crossover
7
limits access to property in one direction? Though the court’s
decision was relatively straightforward, any decision in this area of
law has broad implications for cases concerning loss of access,
regulatory takings and eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the government’s power to take private
8
property for public use and has long been recognized as an
9
implicit attribute of a sovereign government. However, for nearly
as long, courts have attempted to articulate appropriate rules to
10
limit governmental taking of private property.
Within this
contentious context, regulatory takings law has been one of the
11
most consistently debated legal subjects in recent years.
2. Id. at 764.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 765.
6. Id. at 764.
7. Id.
8. BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999) (defining eminent domain as
“the inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the
taking”).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S.
Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Efforts to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings
Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307 (1998) (chastising the U.S. Supreme Court for their
continuing failure to clearly articulate an appropriate standard); James E. Krier,
The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997) (attempting,
somewhat successfully, to explain why takings jurisprudence is a “bewildering
mess”); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411
(1993) (analyzing the politically-charged atmosphere of takings law); Joseph L.
Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council will not have the far-reaching consequences other
commentators have predicted); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle,
The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151
(1997) (proposing legislative endorsement of a judicial case-by-case determination
in lieu of attempting to fashion legislative scheme regulatory determination).
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Moreover, even within takings law, loss of access cases can present
12
particularly complex issues. In imperceptibly differing situations,
13
standards for loss of access cases can vary significantly.
This case note examines the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
14
decision in Dale. Included in this examination is a brief review of
15
the takings jurisprudence in the United States and Minnesota,
focusing on the most important recent decisions concerning loss of
16
access in Minnesota. This note also describes the pertinent facts
17
and reasoning in the Dale decision. In the fourth section, this
18
note dissects and critiques the court’s decision. Finally, this note
concludes that while reaching the proper ruling, the court failed to
clarify the exact analytical framework necessary for loss of access
19
cases in Minnesota.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Takings by the Federal Government
Although scholars debate the extent and scope of their initial
20
justifications, the framers of the United States Constitution clearly
deemed it necessary to protect private property from arbitrary
21
governmental intrusions upon ownership. The manifestation of
22
this sentiment is embodied in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
23
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
While the United States Constitution does not specifically

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Part II.C.
Compare infra Part II.C.1. with Part II.C.2.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B-C.
See infra Part III.A-C.
See infra Part IV.A-D.
See infra Part V.
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 20-29 (1997). See also
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM M AGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 109 (2002) (herinafter SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS).
21. GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 11-13 (David A.
Shultz ed., 1998).
22. BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (7th ed. 1999)(defining Takings Clause as
“the Fifth Amendment provision that prohibits the government from taking
private property for public use without fairly compensating the owner”).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
reads, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” Id.
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grant the government the power of eminent domain, it is generally
24
considered inherent in sovereignty.
As early as the Roman
period, governments used the sovereign power of eminent domain
25
to regulate and acquire land for public purposes. Limitations
upon the government’s ability to take property (e.g., the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause) began appearing in state
26
constitutions in 1777.
The Fifth Amendment, moreover, is
applicable to the state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The United States Supreme Court has reluctantly expanded
27
the scope of governmental actions that require compensation.
28
Currently, there are two general categories of takings. The
29
original category is physical takings. Physical takings occur when
a governmental entity actually takes or physically occupies the land
30
for a public use.
The second category is labeled regulatory
takings because they occur when governmental regulations impose
an inordinate burden on a specific piece of property thereby
31
depriving an owner of the use or enjoyment of that property.
The standard for determining when a physical taking occurs is
32
simple and consistently applied, but the standards for regulatory
takings are extremely complex. Background on regulatory takings
jurisprudence is necessary to put the loss of access in the Dale

24. See DANIEL S. GUY, STATE HIGHWAY CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES 5 (1971);
NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-4 (1997).
25. SKOURAS, supra note 21, at 11; see also GUY, supra note 24, at 4.
26. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 790 (1995) (providing a history of
takings law before the Fifth Amendment).
27. SKOURAS, supra note 21, at 17-27 (developing a brief historical overview of
takings law); SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 20 at 75-110 (detailing major
cases in takings law prior to 1987); Terri L. Lindfors, Note, Regulatory Takings and
the Expansion of Burdens on Common Citizens, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 255, 262
(1998)(discussing regulatory takings law).
28. Allison J. Midden, Note, Taking of Access: Minnesota Supreme Court Declines
to Allow Admission of Evidence of Diminished Access Due to Installation of a Median in a
Takings Case, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 329, 332 (1999).
29. SKOURAS, supra note 21, at 17; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 18
(1997) (explaining physical takings cases).
30. M ANDELKER, supra note 29, at 18; Lindfors, supra note 27, at 261.
31. M ANDELKER, supra note 29, at 18; see also Midden, supra note 28, at 332
n.21.
32. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982)(affirming the traditional rule that physical occupation of property is a
taking).
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33

Properties decision, a result of governmental regulation, in context.
1. Regulatory Takings on the Federal Level
a. The Mahon Decision
Regulatory takings have only fully emerged in the last
34
century. The birth of regulatory takings can be traced to the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
35
Mahon. The facts in Mahon were relatively simple.
Originally, the Pennsylvania Coal Company (“Penn Coal”)
36
owned the entire disputed property. In 1878, when Penn Coal
sold the surface estate, it reserved an interest in the subsurface
37
mineral rights. To preserve that interest, Penn Coal also obtained
38
a waiver against all claims due to subsidence of the surface estate.
39
In 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Kohler Act. The
Kohler Act was designed to prevent catastrophic surface subsidence
40
by prohibiting the mining of coal beneath certain structures.
After Penn Coal informed Mahon of its intention to mine
beneath his home, Mahon sought a protective injunction under the
41
Kohler Act.
The case eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court on appeal. There, Penn Coal argued that the act
was unconstitutional because it deprived them of a subsurface
42
property right. Agreeing, the Court issued what became the first
regulatory takings decision, stating “[t]he general rule at least is
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if

33. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002).
34. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See generally
Thomas A. Hippler, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking
Doctrine, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 653-67 (1987) (discussing the significant
developments and various standards in regulatory takings law). For a recent
review of Mahon and subsequent regulatory takings law, see also Robert Brauneis,
The Foundation of our “Regulatory Takings” Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of
Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
35. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
36. Id. at 412.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 412-13. Specifically, the statute was intended to protect streets,
hospitals, schools, factories and houses. See Brauneis, supra note 34, at 619.
41. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
42. Id.
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regulation goes too far” it will be a taking.43 The Court held that
Penn Coal was unconstitutionally deprived of its subsurface mineral
rights because the Kohler Act exceeded the authority of the state’s
44
police power and, therefore, constituted a taking. At once
enigmatic and simple, this 1922 holding was the first spark in what
45
became the firestorm of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
b. The Penn Central Transportation Decision
For the fifty-six years following the Mahon decision, the United
States Supreme Court was largely silent on the regulatory takings
issue. During this period, legal scholars and courts struggled amidst
46
a great deal of confusion. In 1978, the Court handed down the
next major case in the law of regulatory takings: Penn Central
47
Transportation Co. v. New York.
In 1967, New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission
designated Grand Central Terminal, which was owned by Penn
Central Transportation Company (Penn Central Co.), a historic
48
landmark. As a result of this designation, Penn Central Co. was
restricted in its ability to further develop the property or make any
49
changes to the exterior of the building. Penn Central Co. claimed
that the city’s ordinance effectuated a taking of its property interest
50
in the airspace above Grand Central Terminal. The United States
Supreme Court, while rejecting the owner’s claim, admitted its

43. Id. at 414-15.
44. Id.
45. This standard has been described as “more of an observation about the
difficulty in deciding when compensation should be paid than it is a rule capable
of precise application.” Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regulatory Takings, 20 WM.
M ITCHELL L. REV. 433, 434 (1994).
46. Brauneis, supra note 34, at 680-86; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:
Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 596-97 (1984); see also
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Commentaries on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) (stating
that a “bewildering” array of tests have developed for determining whether a
taking has occurred).
47. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48. Id. at 115-16. The commission was granted this authority under the New
York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law. Id. at 110.
49. Id. at 111. This type of change had to be approved in advance by a
commission. Id. at 112. The designation, however, also granted Penn Central Co.
the ability to transfer unused development rights to contiguous parcels under the
same ownership. Id. at 113-14.
50. Id. at 107.
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51

failure “to develop any ‘set formula’” for takings cases.
Although the Court in Penn Central Transportation
acknowledged that Fifth Amendment cases were essentially “ad hoc
factual inquiries,” the Court identified several relevant factors for
determining whether a governmental regulation went too far and,
52
thus, required compensation.
Briefly, the Penn Central
Transportation factors consider whether: 1) there was an enormous
adverse financial impact upon the owner of the property; 2) the
landowner had a large investment-backed expectation; and 3) the
53
governmental regulation was suspect or a public necessity.
Specifically, a court ought to consider the “economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
54
expectations.” The Penn Central Transportation decision, however,
was not the last word from the Court. In the twenty-five years since
Penn Central Transportation, the United States Supreme Court has
55
decided several other high-profile regulatory cases. In doing so,
56
the Court has enunciated several other tests. However, except in
very specific circumstances, the application of the Penn Central
57
Transportation test is usually appropriate. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has also recently stated that categorical rules
58
ought to be avoided in takings jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, in the takings law arena, reaching agreement
59
on the issues and articulating consistent analytical structures has
51. Id. at 124.
52. Id.
53. Id. This multi-factored test has been the subject of considerable
discussion. See, e.g., Page Carroccia Dringman, Comment, Regulatory Takings: The
Search for a Definitive Standard, 55 M ONT. L. REV. 245, 254-56 (1994) (examining the
existing standards for regulatory takings law); Robert M. Washburn, Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations as a Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63, 65 (1996) (utilizing the Penn Central Transportation
standard to re-assess property rights).
54. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
55. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
56. See infra notes 104-07.
57. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001) (examining an
application of the categorical rule from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and
remanding with instructions to apply the Penn Central Transportation standard
instead).
58. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122
S.Ct. 1465, 1489 (U.S. 2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in
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been difficult. Commentators do agree, however, that takings law
60
represents a continuing theoretical and legal quagmire.
2. Loss of Access in the United States Supreme Court
Although the United States Supreme Court has never
considered a loss of access case during the twentieth century, the
61
Court has addressed the issue three times in the past. These cases
pre-date every major regulatory takings decision. Moreover, the
analysis employed by the Court in these cases relies upon concepts
62
borrowed from the law of servitude and nuisance. As a result, the
reasoning in these decisions, given the broad based development in
63
regulatory takings law in the past one hundred years, borders on
irrelevant for the purposes of present day takings cases. A brief
examination of the few United States Supreme Court decisions that
concern loss of access shows that the factual scenario and the result
were substantially the same in each case.
64
In the 1857 decision, Smith v. Corp. of Washington, the federal
65
government lowered the grade of a street. By doing so, the
government effectively destroyed the access to an abutting tract of
66
property. Twenty-one years later, in 1878, the Court decided
67
Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, a case in which the City of
Chicago had constructed a tunnel and made improvements to the
68
street. These improvements blocked access to the landowner’s
69
property. Only nineteen years after Northern Transportation Co., in
70
1897, the Court decided Gibson v. United States. The claim in
Gibson arose as a result of the federal government’s construction of
71
a dike on the Ohio River which eliminated access to a pier.
In deciding these cases, the United States Supreme Court
utilized other property-related theories as the rationale to support
the Supreme Court’s Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Midden, supra note 28, at 329 n.1.
61. Id. at 336.
62. Takings law was dominated by other property theories for years. See, e.g.,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Hippler, supra note 34, at 655.
63. See supra II.A.1.
64. 61 U.S. 135 (1857).
65. Id. at 136.
66. Id.
67. 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
68. Id. at 636.
69. Id.
70. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
71. Id. at 270.
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their ultimate result. In Smith, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s
action was founded upon the theory that the plaintiff has “a right
72
to keep a nuisance” at the expense of the collective good.
Likewise, in Northern Transportation Co., the Court loosely framed its
73
analysis on nuisance principles. Finally, in Gibson, after the Court
conducted a truncated Fifth Amendment analysis, it concluded that
no taking took place because the improvement was for the public
good and the governmental action was merely an “exercise of a
74
servitude to which her property had always been subject.”
It is certainly noteworthy that the United States Supreme
Court has never found a Fifth Amendment taking in a loss of access
75
case. Perhaps even more significant, the Court has also never
entirely foreclosed the possibility that deprivation of access may
constitute a compensable taking.
3. Police Power on the Federal Level
The act of using land gives rise to an implied obligation;
neither a property owner nor a mere user may use the land in a way
that is injurious to others. The government enforces this
obligation through its police power. Police power has eluded static
76
definition, but courts have used the term in numerous situations
to justify the regulation or taking of property without providing
77
compensation.
78
The modern police power has ancient conceptual origins. As
79
the close legal and theoretical counterpart of eminent domain, it
72. Smith v. Corp. of Washington, 61 U.S. 135, 146 (1857).
73. Northern Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 640.
74. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 275.
75. Midden, supra note 28, at 336.
76. The vague definition of police power often cited is: “the inherent and
pleanry power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the
public security, health, morality and justice.” BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (7th
ed. 1999).
77. See, e.g., Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 (2002).
78. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern
Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857,
861-62 (2000). Justice Talmadge traced the historical roots of police power to the
ancient Greeks: “the ancient Greeks recognized early on the importance of police
power in their political philosophy.” Id. at 861.
79. For a remarkably succinct discussion of the relationship between eminent
domain and the police power of the state, see Dan Herber, Comment, Surviving
the View Through the Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and the Case for Upholding
Development Moratoria, 86 M INN. L. REV. 913, 918-19 (2002). The difference
between the two types of governmental power is simple. “Police powers and
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is also considered an “inherent attribute of sovereignty at all levels
80
of government.” Police power provides the government with “the
power to so regulate the relative rights and duties of all within its
jurisdiction as to guard the public morals, the public safety, and the
public health, as well as to promote the public convenience and the
81
common good.”
In the takings context, police power “encompass[es] the
government’s ability to regulate land use and personal property
82
without incurring the obligation of paying compensation.”
Although the state’s police power cannot be minimized by
requiring compensation whenever the state asserts it, the police
power remains subject to the limitations of the federal and state
83
constitutions.
Although different theories exist to justify the exercise of the
84
police power, the search for a justification is largely an exercise in
semantics. The efforts “to give definition to what may be an
indefinable threshold between the police power and eminent
85
domain have yielded only profound confusion for practitioners.”
Indeed, many decisions are based upon “an unarticulated sense of
fairness or justice that is shrouded in a cloud of paraphrased quotes
86
from unreconciled state and federal decisions.”
Difficult
decisions are sprung from the unclear division between legitimate
eminent domain differ in that ‘[e]minent domain takes property because it is
useful to the public,’ whereas the ‘police power regulates the use of property or
impairs the rights in property because the free exercise of these rights is
detrimental to public interest.’” Id. at 918 (quoting 3 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.02[3], at 16-58 n.42 (internal citations omitted)); see
also Ray v. State Highway Comm’n 410 P.2d 278, 280-82 (Kan. 1966).
80. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 108 (1985).
81. House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282 (1911).
82. Brian D. Lee, Note, Regulatory Takings Depriving All Economically Viable Use
of a Property Owner’s Land Require Just Compensation Unless the Government Can Identify
Common Law Nuisance or Property Principles Furthered by the Regulation, 23 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1840, 1844 n.26 (1993) (citing JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.10, at 423 (4th ed. 1991)). See also Herber, supra note
79, at 918 (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 252-54 (1897)).
83. Marshall v. Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 877, 883-84 (Mo. 1962).
84. For early theories on police power, see T.D. Havran, Eminent Domain and
the Police Power, 5 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 380 (1930); R.S. Wiggin, The Power of the
State to Restrict the Use of Real Property, 1 M INN. L. REV. 135 (1917); Lee, supra note
82, at 1845 n.26.
85. Olson, supra note 45, at 450.
86. Id.
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exercises of the police power and state actions which require
compensation.
B. Minnesota Takings
The Minnesota Constitution, like the United States
87
Constitution, also contains a takings provision which requires
payment of just compensation when land is taken for public use.
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment and the takings provision of the Minnesota
Constitution share several common characteristics. Both ensure
that the government cannot force “some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
88
by the public as a whole.” Minnesota’s provision, like the federal
equivalent, utilizes several different tests to determine when a
89
property owner is entitled to compensation. Like those of many
90
other jurisdictions, the Minnesota takings provision is considered
91
broader in application than the federal equivalent because it
92
contains the language “taken, destroyed or damaged.” Moreover,
the statutory definition of a “taking” in Minnesota includes “every
interference . . . with possession, enjoyment or value of private

87. M INN. CONST. art. I, § 13. This provision “imposes a condition on the
exercise of the state’s inherent supremacy over private property rights.” Johnson
v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Minn. 1978).
88. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
89. See, e.g., Lindfors, supra note 27, at 267-78. See also Olson, supra note 45, at
437-49.
90. Twenty-four other state constitutions also extend compensation to
situations where property is “taken or damaged” rather than only “taken.”
Midden, supra note 28, at 337 n.58. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (“Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or
damaged for public use only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to . . .
the owner”); ILL . CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation”); TEX . CONST. art. I, § 17 (“No
person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public
use without adequate compensation being made”). The remaining twenty-six
states adopt a similar position through judicial interpretation. See Lindfors, supra
note 27, at 259 n.24.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. M INN. CONST. art. I, § 13. This language “was not part of the original
Minnesota Constitution, but was added by amendment in 1896 to overrule court
interpretations that denied consequential or indirect damages.” Olson, supra note
45, at 436.
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93

property.”
Minnesota gives greater protection to landowners than the
federal government. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the takings provision of the Minnesota Constitution is to be given a
94
broad interpretation so as to effectuate its purpose.
Compensation is even appropriate when property is indirectly
95
damaged as a result of state action. Based upon this constitutional
and statutory directive, the “clear intent of Minnesota law is to fully
compensate its citizens for losses related to property rights
96
incurred” as a result of state action.
1. Regulatory Takings in Minnesota
Minnesota regulatory takings law, however, like the federal
97
counterpart, lacks clarity. This is predictable because the United
States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution, with the
exception of “taken, destroyed or damaged,” rely upon virtually the
98
same language. Further, most Minnesota precedent on regulatory
takings is couched in the propositions originally propounded by
99
the United States Supreme Court. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals explicitly recognized that “Minnesota courts generally
100
apply the federal takings standards” to determine whether a land
101
use regulation “deprives the property of all reasonable use.”
Minnesota has used numerous standards to determine when
102
regulation rises to the level of a compensable taking. Minnesota
93. M INN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2.
94. See State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (citing M INN. STAT.
§ 160.08, subd. 5 (1986)).
95. Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 290, 39 N.W. 629, 631
(1888).
96. Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 558.
97. Christopher Dietzen, Regulatory Takings Claims: Lessons from Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, Bench & Bar, Minn. 27, 30 (Feb. 2002) (stating that “regulatory
takings jurisprudence continues to be an area of law that defies any clear cut rules
or answers.”).
98. Compare M INN. CONST. art. I, § 13 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. See, e.g., Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996);
Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 287-88 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996).
100. Arcadia, 552 N.W.2d at 287.
101. See Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); see also Parranto Bros. v. City of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988).
102. See Lindfors, supra note 27 at 273 (describing, in a remarkably detailed
and succinct fashion, the different tests and Minnesota decisions adopting each
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103

courts have used the reasonable use test, the extinguished
104
105
economic value test, the rough proportionality test, the de facto
106
107
test, a variable multiple factor test, and the public necessity
108
doctrine. But, the Minnesota Supreme Court has never candidly
test).
103. See McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257-59 (Minn. 1980).
Under this test, a taking occurs when a government regulation prevents
reasonable use property. Id. at 257. However, this rule is not absolute. When a
regulation has a legitimate objective, no taking occurs unless all reasonable use is
denied. Id. at n. 2. See also Czech v. City of Blaine, 312 Minn. 535, 539, 253 N.W.2d
272, 274 (1977) (finding a taking where the government refused to rezone an area
to accommodate a mobile home park); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553,
572-73, 118 N.W.2d 659, 672 (1962) (holding that a zoning ordinance was
unconstitutional because it rendered some property useless or valueless).
Lindfors, supra note 27, at 273 n.147.
104. Originally enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), this test concerns whether the
government has deprived an owner of all economically beneficial use of property.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993). This test was adopted by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals in 614 Co. v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 547
N.W.2d 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
105. This test was first stated by the United States Supreme Court in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). This test only applies when a development
“condition” is imposed upon a landowner. See Note, California Court of Appeal Finds
Nollan’s and Dolan’s Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2058, 2061-62 (2002). Assuming that a taking would result, the
court must continue and apply the “rough proportionality” test from Dolan. Id. at
2062. This test requires a court to examine the effect of a regulation and
determine whether the state’s purpose adequately justifies the regulation. If such a
“rough proportionality” exists, then the state has no obligation to compensate the
landowner. Id. In Minnesota, under the “rough proportionality” test, three
factors are considered to determine whether a regulation is a taking: if the
regulation “promote(s) a public purpose; is not an unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious interference with a private interest; and the means chosen bear a
rational relation to the public purpose sought to be served.” Arcadia Dev. Corp. v.
City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Grussing
v. Kvam Implement Co., 478 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
106. The de facto test has been used when the amount of control exercised by
the government is suspect and the regulation may have been inappropriately
directed toward a particular parcel. See Lindfors, supra note 27, at 275; Fitger
Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
107. This test is a variation on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Therein, the Court stated that, in
order to constitute a compensable taking, a regulation must either (1) constitute
an impermissible use of the government’s police power; or (2) deny the property
owner of the “economically viable” use of the property. Id. at 260. This test has
been used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Parranto Bros., Inc. v. City of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
108. See Lindfors, supra note 27, at 276. In certain situations, a court is
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examined the varying standards set forth by different Minnesota
109
Court of Appeals decisions and explicitly adopted a single
110
approach.
Moreover, in Minnesota, “no firmly established test
exists for determining when a taking has occurred; instead, takings
111
law turns largely on the particular facts underlying each case.”
Thus, the Minnesota regulatory takings morass mirrors its federal
equivalent. However, in one specific fashion, Minnesota adopts a
different approach than the federal counterpart.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a heightened
standard for regulations involving a governmental enterprise. The
governmental enterprise exception is exemplified by McShane v.
112
City of Faribault. In McShane, the City of Faribault enacted use and
113
building restrictions on the plaintiff’s property because it was
situated next to the expanding city airport. The McShane court
recognized that the regulation was “for the sole benefit of a
114
governmental enterprise” and the land-use regulation was, in
actuality, a shortcut to avoid paying compensation through
115
condemnation proceedings. Because regulations promulgated
for a governmental enterprise are clearly distinguishable from
regulations aimed at benefiting the general public, the court
116
ordered compensation for the landowner.
Although Minnesota has applied the language and the general
rules adopted at the federal level, the extent of Minnesota’s
adoption remains unclear. Except for an additional governmental
enterprise rule and a more clearly articulated eagerness to provide
empowered to invoke the public necessity doctrine. For example, if public
necessity requires destroying a single landowner’s property because its destruction
will divert a more significant community calamity, then the government is
protected in such action. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Red Wing, 13 Minn. 38
(1868).
109. Many of the Minnesota standards for determining whether a
compensable taking has occurred were originally set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. See supra Part II.
110. Many of Minnesota’s takings cases are Minnesota Court of Appeals cases
and the Minnesota Supreme Court has not specifically addressed which standard is
appropriate for determining when a taking occurs in Minnesota. See supra notes
102-107 and accompanying text.
111. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996).
112. 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980); accord Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455
N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
113. McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 255.
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 258-59.
116. Id. However, the court endorsed allowing the city to repeal the zoning
ordinance instead of initiating eminent domain proceedings. Id. at 260.
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compensation, the Minnesota regulatory taking standards definitely
resemble those embodied in the federal regulatory takings law.
2. Police Power in Minnesota
State governments may also exercise sovereign police power to
enact legislation or regulations to promote health, welfare or
public safety.117 The police power standard in Minnesota is as
confused and problematic as its federal counterpart.118 In fact, the
Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the confused
state of the law on one occasion:
The dividing line between restrictions which may be
lawfully imposed under the police power and those which
invade the rights secured to the property owner by the
constitutional provisions that his property shall not be
taken or damaged without compensation, nor he be
deprived of it without due process of law, has never been
distinctly marked out, and probably cannot be. As
different cases arise, the courts determine from the facts
and circumstances of the particular case
whether it falls
119
upon one side or the other of the line.
Police power, as a general concept, lacks clarity.
It is clear, however, that the Minnesota Supreme Court is
willing to grant the state enormous discretion for traffic regulation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted certain specific situations
that ought to be considered non-compensable exercises of the state
police power: “Included in this category are the establishment of
one-way streets and lanes of traffic; median strips prohibiting or
limiting crossovers from one lane of traffic to another; restrictions
on U-turns, left and right turns, and parking; and regulations
120
governing the weight, size, and speed of vehicles.” Under other
circumstances, the court has not hesitated to find an abuse of the
police power and award compensation to an aggrieved
121
landowner.
117. See Lee, supra note 82, at 1844 n.26 (citing several major scholarly works
concerning the scope of the state’s police power in connection with property
owners’ rights).
118. See supra Part II.A.3.
119. State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 230, 158 N.W. 1017,
1019 (1916); accord Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Minn.
1978).
120. Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441, 127 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1964).
121. See Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Minn.
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C. Loss of Access in Minnesota
Loss of access is a subset of the broader “regulatory takings”
category because access is usually lost as a consequence of
governmental regulation. Generally, loss of access claims arise as a
result of road construction, median closures or the re-routing of
traffic. Loss of access issues arise in two distinct factual settings
where: 1) a partial taking of property deprives the landowner of
access and 2) no physical taking occurs but governmental action
122
destroys access nonetheless. The Dale decision arose under the
123
latter circumstance. Maintaining clarity between how these two
situations differ is critically important to determining the
applicable analytical framework and understanding the intricacies
124
of loss of access cases.
1. Loss of Access in Partial Takings
Partial takings occur when the government condemns only a
125
portion of a landowner’s property. In a partial takings scenario,
the government admits to taking property and initiates
126
condemnation proceedings.
A property owner is awarded
damages at that time. In partial takings cases, therefore, only a
single issue exists: the measure of damages.
Determining compensation in a partial takings case can be
difficult because almost any competent evidence may be
considered if it legitimately bears upon the market value of the
127
property. Other factors also further complicate the computation
128
of damages in partial takings cases. The Dale decision does not
raise any of these precise issues though. Instead, Dale presents a
closely related and equally difficult dilemma arising in an inverse
1991)(providing compensation when Minneapolis police officers caused
enormous damage to an innocent third party’s home while pursuing a suspect).
122. Midden, supra note 28, at 340; Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d
763, 768 (Minn. 2002)(Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring specially).
123. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
124. Cynthia M. Filipovich, Note, Inadmissibility of Governmental Highest Possible
Use Evidence in a Partial Takings Case: A Departure from Constitutional Just
Compensation, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 880 (1993).
125. County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Minn.
1997) (Paul H. Anderson, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. M INN. CONST. art. I, § 13; M INN. STAT. § 117.025 subd. 2 (2001).
128. See, e.g., State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 562 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/10

16

Boylan: Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Su
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC

2002]

10/28/2002 11:17 PM

LOSING CLARITY IN LOSS OF ACCESS CASES

711

condemnation situation.
2. Loss of Access in Inverse Condemnation
Loss of access cases are often brought by the landowner as
129
inverse condemnation proceedings. Unlike a partial takings case,
an inverse condemnation case presents the primary issue of
130
whether there has been a taking.
Inverse condemnation,
according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, is “a cause of action
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property
which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
131
been attempted by the taking agency.”
A landowner who brings an inverse condemnation claim must
132
prove that the government is liable for a taking. Compensation is
appropriate if the government’s use of nearby or adjacent property
133
has denied him of use, enjoyment, or value of his land.
In
Minnesota, the trial court has the responsibility to determine
whether a property right has been taken in the constitutional
134
sense.
3. The Minnesota Law Guiding the Dale Decision
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, its resolution of
Dale Properties, LLC v. State was controlled entirely by three of its
135
prior decisions.
It is highly important to grasp the facts and
reasoning of these decisions because regulatory takings decisions
are essentially ad hoc factual inquiries.

129. See, e.g., Gibson v. Comm’r of Highways, 287 Minn 495, 498, 178 N.W.2d
727, 729-30 (1970) (describing the typical inverse condemnation case).
Landowners who believe that they are entitled to compensation may begin
mandamus proceedings by virtue of M INN. STAT. § 117.075 (2001).
130. Filipovich, supra note 124, at 879.
131. Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216 N.W.2d 651,
657 (1974) (quoting Thornburg v. Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 101 (Or. 1962)).
132. Filipovich, supra note 124, at 879.
133. Id. (citing JESSIE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY § 10, at 1098-99
(2d ed. 1988) (internal citation omitted)).
134. Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 476, 170 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1969)
(remanding for a determination of constitutional property damage); see also State
v. Prow’s Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 4, 171 N.W.2d 83, 84 (1969) (relying on
Thomsen and remanding for a determination).
135. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 765-66 (Minn. 2002).
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a. The Hendrickson Decision
An early inverse condemnation case in Minnesota concerning
136
loss of access was Hendrickson v. State. The loss of access occurred
in Hendrickson when the state rebuilt and widened a portion of
137
Highway 63 near Hendrickson’s motel in Rochester, Minnesota.
In 1956, when Hendrickson purchased the disputed property, two
138
driveways provided the motel unlimited access to Highway 63.
Sometime thereafter, the state designated the thoroughfare a
139
140
controlled access highway. In 1958, reconstruction began. The
highway was rebuilt with a median, service roads, and controlled
141
points of entry.
The state did not condemn any of the
142
Hendrickson’s motel property, and the plaintiffs retained access
via the same driveways, but the driveways were shortened from 85
143
feet to 40 feet. Significantly, however, Hendrickson no longer
144
had direct unlimited access to either direction of traffic. Instead,
the property’s remaining access necessitated travel in a circuitous
145
route via the newly installed service road.
The Hendrickson case presented a specific issue: whether the
property “suffered compensable damage by being denied access to
the main thoroughfare except at interchanges yet to be designated,
if the property has unlimited access to a service road over which the
146
main thoroughfare may be reached by a circuitous route.” The
issue, in other words, was whether a landowner is entitled to
compensation for having his once unlimited access reduced to
circuitous access.
According to the Hendrickson court, Minnesota and the weight
of other authority in 1964 adhered to the broad proposition that
“access to a public highway from abutting property . . . may not be
147
denied without compensation.” Controlling or limiting access,
136. 267 Minn. 436, 440, 127 N.W.2d 165, 169 (1964).
137. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167.
138. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167-68.
139. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 168.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167.
142. Id. at 438-39, 127 N.W.2d at 168-69.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 440-41, 127 N.W.2d at 169-70.
146. Id. at 440, 127 N.W.2d at 169.
147. Id. at 440-41, 127 N.W.2d at 169-70 (citing Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn.
48, 57, 19 N.W.2d 394, 399 (1945); Gustafson v. Hamm, 56 Minn. 334, 339, 57
N.W. 1054, 1055 (1894); Underwood v. Town Bd. of Empire, 217 Minn. 385, 388,
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however, was generally considered a non-compensable exercise of
148
the state’s police power. The court acknowledged that in certain
situations traffic regulations which unduly burden a specific
149
property owner “may cause compensable injury.” A compensable
injury to the property, the court continued, could occur if the
limitation in access is “different in kind and not merely in degree
150
from that experienced by the general public.”
The Hendrickson court also stated that Minnesota property
owners have a right to “reasonably convenient and suitable
151
152
access” to an abutting highway in at least one direction.
Furthermore, what constitutes reasonably convenient and suitable
153
access was a fact question for a jury to determine.
b. The Gannons Case
Only two short years later, in 1966, the Minnesota Supreme
154
Court decided State by Mondale v. Gannons, Inc., another inverse
155
condemnation case concerning loss of access. The loss of access
156
in Gannons also arose from road construction.
The roadway
adjacent to Gannons’ property was rebuilt to provide for the
157
installation of a median and one-way traffic in both directions. As
in Hendrickson, the median limited Gannons’ once unlimited access
158
to a circuitous route. The plaintiff petitioned for condemnation
proceedings, alleging that the highest and best use of the property
159
had changed from restaurant to industrial.
Evidence in the
14 N.W.2d 459, 461 (1944); State by Burnquist, v. Miller Home Dev., Inc., 243
Minn. 1, 9, 65 N.W.2d 900, 905 (1954). See W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Abutting
Owner’s Right to Damages or Other Relief for Loss of Access Because of Limited-Access
Highway or Street, 43 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1955) and C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Power to
Restrict or Interfere with Access of Abutter by Traffic Regulations, 73 A.L.R.2d 689, 691
(1960)).
148. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 440, 127 N.W.2d at 169.
149. Id. at 442, 127 N.W.2d at 170.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 446, 127 N.W.2d at 173. Accord Johnson v. Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d
603, 605 (Minn. 1978); Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
152. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 436, 127 N.W.2d at 165.
153. Id. at 445-46, 127 N.W.2d at 172-73.
154. 275 Minn. 14, 145 N.W.2d 321 (1966).
155. Id. at 14, 145 N.W.2d at 321.
156. Id. at 16, 145 N.W.2d at 324.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 17, 145 N.W.2d at 325.
159. Id.
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record showed, however, that after the road construction, the
plaintiff re-modeled his restaurant and his business actually
160
increased. A hearing was held and the court determined that the
161
property had suffered no damage.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited several
162
sections of the Hendrickson decision and reiterated their assertion
that addition of a median or dividers in a roadway cannot compel
163
compensation.
The court stated that although a complete or
unreasonable blocking of an abutter’s access would constitute a
taking, the regulation (taking) of access in only one direction was
164
not necessarily compensable.
In order to be consistent with Hendrickson, if the remaining
access was not reasonably convenient and suitable, then
compensation would be required. In its opinion, however, the
Gannons court did not reach the question of whether the
165
remaining access was reasonably convenient and suitable.
Rather, the court ordered a new trial because the jury may have
166
been confused by ambiguous instructions.
The Gannons decision, therefore, was relatively hollow. The
Minnesota Supreme Court did not extend or modify the existing
law in Gannons. It also failed to articulate a standard for
determining reasonably convenient and suitable access. In fact, the
decision may have been a step backward. If one overlooks why the
167
case was remanded, it may appear that the court eliminated the
“reasonably convenient and suitable access” requirement of their
168
loss of access compensation test from Hendrickson.
c. The Blaine Building Case
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not address another loss of
160. State by Mondale v. Gannons, Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 17, 145 N.W.2d 321, 325
(1966).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 20, 145 N.W.2d at 326 (quoting Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436,
440, 127 N.W.2d 169, 171).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 24, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
165. Id. at 24-25, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
166. Id. at 25, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
167. Id.
168. In fact, Justice Paul H. Anderson discusses the potential for misreading
this ambiguity in his concurring opinion to the Dale Properties decision. Dale
Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Minn. 2002) (Paul H. Anderson, J.,
concurring specially).
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access case until some thirty years later in Anoka v. Blaine Building
169
Corp. In Blaine Building, an abutting landowner once again lost
170
access as a result of road construction. Anoka County widened a
portion of University Avenue and installed a median which
prevented access in one direction to and from the plaintiff’s
171
properties.
Significantly, unlike Hendrickson and Gannons, the
plaintiff’s property was also subject to a partial taking in connection
172
with the highway reconstruction project.
As in Hendrickson, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
loss of access in one direction is non-compensable where
reasonably convenient and suitable access is retained in the other
173
direction. The court concluded that loss of access “may not be
the basis of severance damages where a property owner is subject to
a partial taking and coincidentally loses access due to the
174
construction of a median barrier.”
The dissenting opinion
observed the court’s decision mistakenly relied upon inverse
175
condemnation precedent in what was clearly a partial takings
176
context.
The real issue in Blaine Building was whether the loss of access
ought to be considered in the partial takings damage
177
computation.
After Blaine Building, therefore, a possibility
remained that if a median closure eliminated access in one
direction and the remaining access was not reasonably convenient
and suitable, compensation would be appropriate.
In Minnesota, and elsewhere, loss of access cases require
intricate analysis. However, the milieu is traversable. Gannons is a
relatively hollow decision because it relies entirely on Hendrickson
and does not extend the law any further. Moreover, the holding in

169. 566 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1997).
170. Id. at 333.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Compare Johnson Bros. Grocery, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 75, 229
N.W.2d 504 (1975). In Johnson Bros., a highway construction project eliminated
the plaintiff’s immediate access to the highway. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
relying upon Hendrickson, found a taking and ordered compensation. Id. at 505.
But see Courteaus, Inc. v. State, 268 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1978) (a similar fact
situation with a contrary result based upon the same precedent).
174. Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn. 1997).
175. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 441, 127 N.W.2d at 170; Gannons, Inc., 275
Minn. at 14, 145 N.W.2d at 321.
176. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 339 (Paul H. Anderson, J., dissenting).
177. Midden, supra note 28, at 349.
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Blaine Building, because it was a partial taking case, should have had
little effect on Dale’s resolution. In sum, the foregoing cases
suggest that, regardless of context, the Minnesota Supreme Court is
not eager to grant compensation for loss of access when the
property retains access in at least one direction.
III. THE DALE DECISION
A. Facts
Dale Properties, LLC (Dale), owns approximately 29 acres of
178
undeveloped land in Oakdale, Minnesota.
In 1965, the state
179
condemned
a portion of the Dale Property to build an
180
interchange at the intersection of Interstate 694 and Highway 5.
As a result, access to and from Dale’s property was reduced to a
single point which provided access to both directions of traffic on
181
Highway 5.
Sometime between 1973 and 1997, a median was
182
installed on Highway 5.
A median crossover point opposite
Dale’s property was maintained and, therefore, Dale retained full
183
and unrestricted access to and from Highway 5.
In 1997, the median crossover opposite Dale’s property on
Highway 5 was closed by the Minnesota Department of
184
Transportation.
The closure eliminated direct access to the
185
westbound lane of Highway 5.
Today, the property remains
186
under the same zoning designations despite the restricted access.
178. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Minn. 2002).
179. This condemnation proceeding was entitled State v. Morphew-James
Investments Co. et. al. Respondent’s brief at 4, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638
N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
180. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 619 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000), rev’d, 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002). At one point, the Dale property had
unlimited access to Interstate 694 and Highway 5. As a result of the 1965
condemnation proceeding, the state limited Dale’s access to a thirty-foot portion
of Highway 5 memorialized in a 1973 Final Certificate issued at the conclusion of
the condemnation proceedings. Id. at 570.
181. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764. Bordering the property to the west is
Interstate 694. Id. To the east of the property is another parcel of land owned by a
third party who is uninvolved in this litigation. Id. On the south side, there is a
railroad right of way. Id. On the north side, where the property is bordered by
Highway 5, a thirty foot access point exists on the west edge of the property. Id.
182. Id. at 570.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. The property, at the time of the supreme court hearing, was zoned
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On at least two occasions, Dale has attempted to sell or
develop the property. In 1997, before the crossover was closed,
Dale had entered into a purchase agreement with Ryan Companies,
187
Inc. (Ryan).
However, after the crossover was closed, Ryan
canceled the sale. Likewise, a purchase agreement signed in 1998
with Security Capital Pacific Trust (“Security”), was canceled by
Security. Security and Ryan both cited complications arising
directly from the restricted access to the property as the primary
impetus behind the cancellation of their respective purchase
188
agreements.
As a result, in March of 1999, Dale petitioned the court for a
writ of mandamus seeking the initiation of an inverse
189
condemnation proceeding. Specifically, Dale alleged difficulty in
developing or selling the property and a diminution in value of
190
approximately $800,000.
B. Procedural History
Before the trial court, the State of Minnesota moved for
summary judgment on grounds that the existence of access in at
191
least one direction precluded the cause of action. Apparently
192
agreeing, the trial court granted summary judgment. On appeal,
193
the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, noting
that the trial court had failed to consider whether the retained
194
access was “reasonably convenient and suitable.”
The State
subsequently petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to review
Industrial Office (northerly portion), General Industrial (southerly portion) and
guided Commercial. Respondent’s Brief at 3, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638
N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Affidavit of Scott Rupert, Thomas
Loucks).
187. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Affidavit of Alan Dale).
188. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Affidavit of Alan Dale, John Lang, Joseph
Fogarty).
189. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
190. Id. Dale alleged that “before the (median) closing, the highest and best
use of the property was threefold: a convenience store with gas pumps, a hotel
with a restaurant, and office buildings and warehouse space. Dale claimed that,
after the closing, the highest and best use was residential development.” Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 619 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000), rev’d, 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002).
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195

the case and certiorari was granted.
On its face, this appears
surprising as the appellate court’s remand was entirely reasonable,
sound and in accord with Minnesota precedent. Presumably, the
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the case because they
saw an opportunity in the Dale case to clarify Minnesota regulatory
takings jurisprudence.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. It
concluded that “a property owner who retains access to traffic in
one direction, although losing it in the other direction due to the
closure of a median crossover, retains reasonable access as a matter
196
of law.”
In reaching this conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme
Court relied heavily on the reasoning expressed in Hendrickson,
197
Gannons and Blaine Building.
The important policy considerations were explicitly
198
highlighted in the court’s opinion.
Most of the policy
justifications and case citations were transplanted directly from
199
Hendrickson, Gannons and Blaine Building.
First, the court noted the state’s placement of highway
200
medians as an exercise of police power. Highway medians are
201
considered a part of the state’s duty to create safe roadways.
Generally, the court stated, the maintenance of safe roadways is
202
considered a legitimate exercise of the police power. Second, the
203
court noted that medians result in general travel restrictions.
Usually, travel restrictions such as medians are not unique to any
204
property owner, and thus, cannot constitute a “taking.” Third,
the closure of the median crossover did not constitute a substantial
impairment of the Dale property’s right of access because only
195. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 765-66.
198. Id. at 766-67.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 766; see also Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 442, 127 N.W.2d
165, 170 (Minn. 1964).
201. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 766.
202. Id.
203. Id. Specifically, the court stated that “restrictions on travel that result
from the use of highway medians affect all members of the traveling public and
are not unique to abutting property owners.” Id.
204. Id. at 766; see also Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441, 127 N.W.2d
169, 170 (Minn. 1964).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/10

24

Boylan: Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Su
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC

2002]

10/28/2002 11:17 PM

LOSING CLARITY IN LOSS OF ACCESS CASES

719

205

circuitry of route resulted.
Fourth, and finally, the court
expressed a reluctance to create “a legal environment in which the
206
cost of regulating traffic is prohibitive.”
The court determined that “closure of the median crossover
opposite Dale’s access point was a noncompensable exercise of the
207
state’s police power.”
The Dale decision has a more serious
consequential reach though. It has essentially foreclosed the
possibility in Minnesota that compensation could ever be
appropriate when a median is closed and access in one direction is
208
lost.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Dale decision afforded the Minnesota Supreme Court an
209
occasion to revisit and clarify the Minnesota loss of access cases.
Unfortunately, the court did not carefully utilize its longstanding
precedent to clearly articulate the necessary analysis a trial court
210
should use in a loss of access case. Furthermore, the Minnesota
Supreme Court ran afoul of the historically broad Minnesota
definition of property rights and governmental actions subject to
211
the takings limitation. Finally, the court failed to fully consider
the various analytical frameworks presented on the federal level
and adopt a clear standard for regulatory takings in Minnesota.
The result in Dale is an overly broad rule. Dale’s holding
unnecessarily curtails the limitations on the power of eminent
domain and perpetuates the existing uncertainty in Minnesota
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
A. The Correct Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon Hendrickson,
212
Gannons and Blaine Building to resolve Dale. Although these cases

205. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767; see also People v. Sayig, 101 Cal.App.2d
890, 226 P.2d 702, 711 (1951).
206. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 764. “[A] property owner who retains access to traffic in one
direction, although losing it in the other direction due to the closure of a median
crossover, retains reasonable access as a matter of law.” Id.
209. Id. 763.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part II.B.
212. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765-66.
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213

arose in analytically different scenarios, the Minnesota Supreme
Court acknowledged a merger of these analyses and concluded it
214
had no effect on the ultimate finding in Dale. As Justice Paul
Anderson astutely observed in his concurrence, “the irony of citing
Blaine Building. to support the result reached in the case before us
today is that the inverse condemnation cases inappropriately relied
upon in Blaine Building. are appropriate” for Dale’s inverse
215
condemnation claim. Regardless, in light of the current law on
loss of access in Minnesota, the court made the correct decision.
Like in Hendrickson or Gannons, the Dale property retains
reasonably convenient and suitable access to the main
216
thoroughfare in at least one direction.
In Dale’s specific
circumstances, closure of the median crossover requires those
wishing to enter the property from the east to travel only an
217
additional five-eighths of a mile. Likewise, those wishing to exit
the property and travel west are required to travel only one
218
additional mile.
Minor inconvenience alone should not be a
219
determinative factor in any takings analysis.
Therefore,
according to the standard enunciated in Hendrickson and reiterated
220
in Gannons, no taking occurred in this instance. Arriving at the
correct conclusion, however, does not necessarily indicate that the
court employed an appropriate analytical process to reach its
decision.
B. Unpacking the Public Policy
The primary question presented by the Dale case was whether
the closure of a median crossover was within the state’s police
power. Dale falls squarely on the division between legitimate
exercises of police power and state actions subject to the takings
limitation. Thus, the court relied upon public policy to drive its

213. Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Minn. 1997) (Paul H.
Anderson, J., dissenting).
214. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
215. Id. at 768 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring specially).
216. Id. at 764-65.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. At least one other jurisdiction has considered the level of inconvenience
as a factor in takings determination. See infra note 232.
220. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 768 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring
specially).
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221

ultimate result.
At first glance, the court’s policy justifications
seem legitimate. However, upon closer examination, a suspicion
arises that the court attempted to blanket its determination of the
central issue in Dale with a plethora of precedent and only loosely
applicable policy justifications.
The court began by recognizing the state’s duty to create and
222
maintain safe roadways.
Furthermore, the court noted that it
may be important, as a public policy matter, to ensure that the cost
223
of regulating traffic does not become prohibitive. However, the
state cannot avoid compensating landowners simply by designating
224
the activity a legitimate exercise of its police power. Instead, the
focus ought to remain upon the injury to the property rather than
225
upon the nature of the state’s activity.
The remaining policy factors cited by the court also lack the
necessary levels of relevancy and analytical substance. For example,
the court’s argument that compensation is not required when a
226
state creates general travel restrictions, is wholly flawed. The
problem with the stated policy justification is simply put: this travel
restriction affected only the Dale property. The median closure in
Dale was not a general travel restriction. Median closures that
prevent numerous roadway users from crossing over may constitute
general travel restrictions.
The issue is significantly more
complicated when the closure of a median crossover prevents only
one specific property owner’s access and does not truly affect other
foreseeable roadway users.
Dale presented the exact situation envisioned by the
Hendrickson court when it noted a taking may occur if damage to a
specific property owner is “different in kind and not merely in
227
degree from that experienced by the general public.” The effect
of the Dale travel restriction is clearly not shared equally amongst
221. Id. at 766-67.
222. Id. at 766.
223. Id. at 767.
224. Respondent’s Brief at 20 n.8, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d
763 (Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 44142, 127 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1964)). See also Balog v. State Dept. of Roads, 131
N.W.2d 402, 407 (Neb. 1964) (stating “The fact that the improvement of a
highway is an exercise of the police power does not determine whether the
landowner or lessee is entitled to recover damages.”).
225. Respondent’s Brief at 20, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
226. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 766-67.
227. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 442, 127 N.W.2d at 170.
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all the traveling public. Rather, the specific property owner is
forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the regulation – a
result both the United States and Minnesota Takings Clauses were
228
expressly designed to avoid.
Finally, the court noted “as long as property owners have
access to the abutting highway in at least one direction, the use of
highway medians that prohibit crossover from one traveled lane to
another merely results in circuity of route, as opposed to
229
substantial impairment of the right of access.”
In this case,
though the Dale’s property continues to be zoned industrial and
guided commercial, large commercial vehicles simply cannot access
the property from the westbound lane of Highway 5 because entry
230
and exit necessitate wide U-turns in a high traffic area.
The existence of circuitous access does not necessarily
preclude a finding of substantial impairment. The court looked to
the circuitous access in Dale and summarily determined there was
231
not a substantial impairment of access. This was improper. A
court should consider the circuitous nature of the remaining access
as a factor (but not a determinative factor) in whether there is a
232
substantial impairment of access.
Legitimate policy justifications were crucial in Dale because the
governmental regulation created an enormous burden for a
233
specific landowner. The policy cited by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Dale simply fails to meet this challenge.
C. Shortened Analysis was Inappropriate
The shortened analysis in Dale was inappropriate and, as a
result, the ruling was inexcusably expansive. The Dale court
concluded that a property owner who retains access to traffic in
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767.
230. Respondent’s Brief at 36, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
231. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
232. The North Dakota Supreme Court has adopted this view in Boehm v.
Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671, 674 (N.D. 1992). In Boehm, the court stated that
although diversion of public traffic does not create a right to compensation, “loss
of traffic, loss of business, and circuitry of travel are factors to be fairly weighed in
determining the reasonableness of access remaining to and from an adjacent
highway after the direct physical disturbance by closure of the street intersection.”
Id. See also Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So.2d 846, 849-50 (Fla. 1989).
233. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
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one direction when a median crossover is closed, “retains
234
reasonable access as a matter of law.” In support of this ruling,
the court noted that median closure was a specific example of non235
compensable governmental regulation in Hendrickson.
The rule announced in Dale is inappropriate for several
reasons. First, although the court notes this decision assumes an
236
extreme situation will not arise, it is certainly within the realm of
possibilities that a closure of a median crossover could cause a
237
“substantial interference with the possession, enjoyment or value”
of a property and, thus, constitute a taking. In other words, a fact
situation in which the closure of a median crossover necessitates an
238
additional one or two mile roundabout is not inconceivable. One
must ask: how far would the average Minnesotan be willing to
extend their personal daily commute before declaring their
239
circuitous access something more than a mere inconvenience?
This ruling also disregards the Minnesota landowner’s right to
240
“reasonably convenient and suitable” access.
The slow, yet
nonchalant, degradation of this property right contradicts the
241
traditional broad protection afforded landowners in Minnesota.
As noted above, the Minnesota Constitution and statutes evince a
clear policy toward providing compensation when state action
234. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
235. Id. at 766 (quoting Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 440-41, 127
N.W.2d 165, 169-70 (1964)).
236. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767 n.1.
237. Id. at 765 (citing Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605
(Minn. 1978)).
238. Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have awarded damages when the
restriction or limitation of access creates an undue burden on a specific
landowner. See, e.g., State v. Jacobs, 440 P.2d 32, 36 (Ariz. 1968) (stating that
damages for loss of access cannot be “wholly contingent on the fortuity that there
be an actual physical taking of property” and ordering compensation for loss of
access); State v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8, 10-11 (Nev. 1970) (finding an additional
one and a half miles of travel to be a substantial impairment); South Carolina
State Highway Dept. v Allison, 143 S.E.2d 800 (S.C. 1965)(awarding damages when
the frontage road connected with the controlled-access highway seven-tenths of a
mile south of the owner’s property).
239. Drivers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area already face one of the most
congested metropolitan areas in the nation. See, e.g., “News Release June 20, 2002:
New study shows traffic congestion in the Twin Cities costing drivers more in time
and money” available at: http://www.dot.state.mn.us/newsrels/02/06/20tti.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2002); “Urban Mobility Report” Texas Transportation Institute,
(2002) (available at http://www.dot.state.mn.us/newsrels/02/06/20tti.html).
240. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 768-69 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring
specially).
241. See supra Part II.B.
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242

harms property.
Moreover, according to the Hendrickson
decision, what constitutes “reasonably convenient and suitable
243
access” is a fact question for a jury’s determination.
Thus,
circuitous access resulting from a closure of a median crossover
244
should not be “reasonable access as a matter of law.” Instead, the
court should allow a jury to determine whether the access is
245
reasonably convenient and suitable.
The shortened analysis is the most troubling aspect of the Dale
decision. The existing analytical structure from Hendrickson and
Gannons, which permitted the state to eliminate access in one
direction so long as reasonably convenient and suitable access
remained, was sound. The state already enjoyed broad discretion in
traffic regulation under that structure. Moreover, a possibility
remained that a particularly onerous median closure might still
constitute a compensable taking.
The court could have charted a more cautious course by
simply reiterating and applying the Hendrickson and Gannons
246
structure.
The court would have preserved Minnesota
landowner’s right to reasonably convenient and suitable access in
median closure cases. Instead, the court adopted a categorical rule
which eliminated any possibility that a median crossover closure
247
might be a compensable taking.
D. The Penn Central Transportation Alternative
As noted above, Hendrickson and Gannons controlled the
resolution of Dale. Both were decided while Mahon was the United
States Supreme Court’s only declaration concerning regulatory
248
takings.
Since then, the United States Supreme Court has
249
outlined several analytical frameworks for takings determinations.
242. Id.
243. Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 445-46, 127 N.W.2d 165, 172-73
(1964).
244. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
245. Moreover, when determining whether the remaining access is reasonably
convenient and suitable, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the “nature
of the property” must be considered, as well as the “circumstances peculiar to each
case.” Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Minn. 1978).
246. The Minnesota Supreme Court could have remanded the case with
instructions to examine whether the remaining access was reasonably convenient
and suitable.
247. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
248. See supra Part II.A.1.
249. Id.
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250

Minnesota has even occasionally recognized these alternatives.
Little prevented the Minnesota Supreme Court from examining
these alternatives and adopting a new framework for loss of access
cases in Dale.
The standard enunciated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York remains the most consistent and well-reasoned takings
251
framework.
The Penn Central Transportation standard, as
highlighted above, utilizes a combination of factors to determine
252
when a taking has occurred. Once again, these factors include
whether 1) there was an enormous adverse financial impact upon
the owner of the property; 2) the landowner had a large
investment-backed expectation; and 3) the governmental
253
regulation was suspect or a public necessity.
The Minnesota
Supreme Court, rather than creating a categorical rule for median
closures, could have utilized this standard. A brief examination of
Dale under this analytical configuration is revealing.
First, under the Penn Central Transportation standard, it is clear
that the median closure had a significant financial impact on the
Dale property. The alleged diminution in the property’s value was
254
$800,000 because the median closure resulted in an inability to
255
develop or sell the land.
Other jurisdictions have deemed
compensation appropriate when the closure of a median causes
256
such great inconvenience and related diminution in value. On
the basis of this factor alone, compensation may seem appropriate.
Applying the second and third factors of Penn Central
Transportation, however, dictates a different result. Herein, the
250. See supra Part II.B.1.
251. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn
Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 Neb. L. Rev.
465, 512-14 (2001) (stating that Penn Cent. Transp. is the basic test of all takings
and that the continuing “importance of Penn Central is its pragmatic rejection of
per se rules in favor of a balancing process. Only such a flexible approach can
address the complexity of takings decisions.”).
252. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124. See also supra Part II.A.1.
253. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
254. Whether reduction in value, by itself, can constitute grounds for a
compensable taking is a very slippery question. For a remarkably lengthy
discussion of this topic see Anthony Saul Alperin, The “Takings” Clause: When Does
Regulation “Go Too Far”, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 169 (2002).
255. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
256. See, e.g., Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So.2d 846, 849-50 (Fla. 1989);
State Dept. of Transp. v. Kreider, 658 So.2d 548, 550 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995); City of
Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1969).
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257

most salient fact is the lack of investment-backed expectations in
258
the property. Moreover, as the Minnesota Supreme Court noted,
traffic regulations generally represent legitimate exercises of the
259
state’s police power. These factors, even in light of the significant
diminution in value, weigh heavily against finding a compensable
taking in Dale.
Examining Dale under the Penn Central
Transportation analytical structure would most likely provide the
same immediate result. But, clearly adopting Penn Central
Transportation would have more favorable long-term consequences
than adopting the categorical rule set forth by the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court would have done well to adopt
the Penn Central Transportation standard in Dale. Although the
resolution of Dale would not have been enormously impacted,
adopting Penn Central Transportation for loss of access cases would
have avoided the announcement of an overly broad rule.
Furthermore, its adoption also would have maintained the
possibility of compensable median closures. Finally, and most
importantly, its application would have signaled a serious
commitment to clarifying Minnesota regulatory takings law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have chosen at least two
260
less drastic approaches to resolving the takings issue. First, the
court could have remanded the case with instructions based upon
Hendrickson and Gannons. Second, the court could have explicitly
adopted and applied one of the analytical frameworks developed by
United States Supreme Court. Either option would have more
properly served the dual goals of clarifying the confusion in this
area and respecting the limitations embedded in the Takings
Clause.
Regardless, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a mistake by
257. What actually constitutes an investment-backed expectation is also the
subject of enormous debate. See, e.g., Daniel Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 216-20 (Spring 1995); Karen
Brunner, A Missed Opportunity: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Leaves Investment-Backed
Expectations Unclear as Ever, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 117, 146-150 (2001).
258. The Dale property was undeveloped. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
259. Id. As noted above, however, not all traffic regulation should necessarily
be considered non-compensable exercises of the state’s police power. See supra
Part IV.B. and n.232.
260. See also Dietzen, supra note 97, at 27.
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adopting a broad rule in Dale because generally, in takings
261
jurisprudence, categorical rules should be avoided. After Dale,
landowners in Minnesota can be deprived of access, so long as they
retain access in the other direction, at any time and in any place,
without compensation. Although the Dale court attempted to
simplify the law, the opinion left the disorder inherent in
Minnesota takings law fully intact.

261. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122
S.Ct. 1465, 1489 (U.S. 2002). The United States Supreme Court states that the
formulation of a general rule in certain takings contexts “is a suitable task for state
legislatures.” Id. Furthermore, the Court notes that the “temptation to adopt
what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.” Id. (citing
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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